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Abstract
Background: In an attempt to reduce harm related to gambling problems, an Internet sports
betting service provider, bwin Interactive Entertainment, AG (bwin), imposes limits on the amount
of money that users can deposit into their online gambling accounts. We examined the effects of
these limits on gambling behavior.
Methods: We compared (1) gambling behavior of those who exceeded deposit limits with those
who did not, and (2) gambling behavior before and after exceeding deposit limits. We analyzed 2
years of the actual sports gambling behavior records of 47000 subscribers to bwin.
Results: Only 160 (0.3%) exceeded deposit limits at least once. Gamblers who exceeded deposit
limits evidenced higher average number of bets per active betting day and higher average size of
bets than gamblers who did not exceed deposit limits. Comparing the gambling behavior before
and after exceeding deposit limits revealed slightly more unfavorable gambling behavior after
exceeding deposit limits.
Conclusion: Our findings indicate that Internet gamblers who exceed deposit limits constitute a
group of bettors willing to take high risks; yet, surprisingly, they appear to do this rather
successfully because their percentage of losses is lower than others in the sample. However, some
of these gamblers exhibit some poor outcomes. Deposit limits might be necessary harm reduction
measures to prevent the loss of extremely large amounts of money and cases of bankruptcy. We
discuss how these limits might be modified based on our findings.
Background
The Internet is a relatively new medium available for
wagering. Research indicating how many people partici-
pate in Internet gambling is scarce. Two empirical studies
published prevalence estimates of Internet gambling
among the US general population: these studies reported
rates of 0.3% [1] and 4% [2]. Among 1294 adults from a
representative sample in Ontario, 5.3% reported having
gambled on the Internet during the past 12 months [3].
Using a representative national sample from the United
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States, researchers reported a lower rate of 2.5% for col-
lege students [4]. Although some observers note that
Internet gambling growth is slow compared to other
forms of gambling, e.g. casinos and lottery [5], Internet
gambling is prolific and growing [6]. Therefore, examin-
ing the influence of Internet gambling on public health is
important.
Research examining land-based gambling suggests that
adverse gambling-related outcomes often include finan-
cial distress, emotional and physical deterioration, and
damaged interpersonal relationships [7]. Some research
suggests that disordered gambling relates to poor mental
health, such as personality and psychiatric disorders [8,9].
Researchers, public policy makers, and public health offi-
cials have argued that Internet gambling is associated with
similar public health threats [10-13]. One study reported
that Internet gambling was linked to pathological gam-
bling and associated with poor physical and mental
health [14]. Because this is the only study providing
empirical data about health correlates of Internet gam-
bling, and because this study provides results based on
retrospective self-reports of a locally restricted sample of
patients in clinic waiting areas, what we actually know
about the health dangers of Internet gambling remains
limited.
Speculations about potential hazards particular to Inter-
net gambling include the apparent lack of fail-safes, such
as the inability to protect individuals who are underage or
people known to have gambling-related problems and to
prevent gambling while intoxicated or gambling at work
[15]. However, the Internet also provides a unique oppor-
tunity for implementing special safeguards and harm
reduction efforts. For example, tracking software can
record all gambling online activity, which companies
could potentially use to control the extent of gambling by
specific users. Web-based technology could limit the time
per gambling session or the amount of money partici-
pants can use to gamble. Recent recommendations for
Internet gambling operators include accepting payments
with credit cards only, providing options to self-limit
gambling expenditure, and providing options that allow
users to self-exclude from an Internet site [16].
In this study, we explore a harm reduction feature cur-
rently unique to Internet gambling. As part of their corpo-
rate social responsibility agenda, a large Internet sports
betting service provider, bwin Interactive Entertainment,
AG (bwin), imposes limits on the amount of money that
users can deposit into their online gambling accounts
within a given time period. When a user tries to deposit
more than the allowed amount, bwin sends the user a
notification message about the attempt to exceed deposit
limits and rejects the attempted deposit. We expected that
users who received a notification message constitute a
group of extremely engaged gamblers, and we therefore
hypothesized that exceeding deposit limits would be asso-
ciated with unfavorable gambling behavior, such as exces-
sively large betting, high losses or high frequency of
playing (i.e., high financial and/or temporal engage-
ment). Furthermore, we expected that receiving a notifica-
tion message would act as a warning sign to users;
consequently, we hypothesized that exceeding deposit
limits would attenuate gambling behavior that followed
exceeding the limit. To examine these possibilities, this
study compares (1) the gambling behavior of those who
exceeded deposit limits with those who did not, and (2)
the gambling behavior of consumers before and after
exceeding deposit limits.
Methods
Sample
The research cohort included 48114 people who regis-
tered with bwin  between February 1 and February 28,
2005, and who deposited money in their accounts before
February 28, 2007. bwin is primarily an Internet sports
gambling service, offering two types of sports bets: fixed-
odds bets and live-action bets. Fixed-odds bets are made
on the outcomes of sporting events or games before the
events begin. The amount paid for a winning bet is set
(fixed) by the betting service at the time of the bet. Live-
action bets are made while the event is in progress. In
addition to bets on the outcome of the event, the betting
service offers bets on selected outcomes within the sport-
ing event (e.g., which side will have the next corner kick).
Fixed-odds bets are relatively slow-cycling betting propo-
sitions. The outcomes of a bet are generally not known for
hours or days later. In contrast, live-action bets provide
relatively quick-paced betting propositions posed in real-
time during the progress of a sporting event.
Some subscribers in the cohort did not engage in fixed-
odds or live-action sports gambling (n = 1114, < 3%).
Consequently, these subscribers were excluded from the
study, leaving 47000 sports-betting subscribers for the
current analysis. This cohort consisted of 43222 (92.0%)
men and 3778 (8.0%) women. The mean age of subscrib-
ers was 30.3 years (SD = 9.9) and the cohort included peo-
ple from 84 countries, with most people (n = 26955,
57.4%) from Germany, followed by Turkey (n = 2846,
6.1%), Poland (n = 2834, 6.0%), Spain (n = 2754, 5.9%),
and Greece (n = 2586, 5.5%). The majority, 31544
(67.1%), placed both fixed-odds and live-action bets,
14723 (31.3%) played fixed-odds only, and 733 (1.6%)
played live-action only.
Measures
bwin prepared a dataset of the actual Internet sports gam-
bling behavior of this cohort for the 2+-year period,Harm Reduction Journal 2008, 5:27 http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/5/1/27
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between February 1, 2005 and February 28, 2007. More
specifically, this dataset included the daily aggregates of
betting activity (i.e., the aggregate number of bets,
amount of money wagered, and amount of money won
for fixed-odds and live-action sports betting per calendar
day) for all participants in the cohort.
Exceeding Deposit Limits
bwin  provides several ways of limiting the amount of
money that users can deposit in their accounts. By default,
bwin  does not allow users to deposit more than 1000
Euros per 24 hours or 5000 Euros per 30 days (or currency
equivalents). One exception to this default is a flexible
limit system, which automatically increases allowable
deposit limits by the subscribers' amount of winnings
from gambling. A second exception occurs when subscrib-
ers can evidence exceptional financial means. In such
cases, users may have higher deposit limits. At the other
end of the spectrum, users can choose to set for them-
selves lower maximum deposit amounts per 30 days.
Users repeatedly can adjust these self-limits to their needs.
Exceeding any deposit limit leads bwin to issue a notifica-
tion message. Although we have information about if and
when a user received such notification, we do not have
information about the type of limit (i.e., self or company)
that initiated the notification message. Thus, this study
explores the combined effects of exceeding company- and
self-imposed deposit limits.
Gambling Behavior
Based on the daily aggregates of betting activity, we com-
puted four measures of gambling behavior for each user:
percentage of days within the active period from first to
last betting day on which the user placed bets (i.e., percent
active betting days); the average number of bets per active
betting day; the average size of bets in Euros; and a cate-
gorical measure of percent lost. These measures are more
adequate than gross totals of number of bets or money
wagered when comparing the gambling behavior of dif-
ferent users. Each measure was computed for fixed-odds
and live-action betting separately, aggregated across the
total 2-year observation period. Further, within the subset
of people who received a notification message, each meas-
ure was computed for the period of time before as well as
after the first receipt of a notification message (note that
the day of receipt of the notification message was defined
as an 'after' day).
We defined the percentage of active betting days as the
percent of days within the interval from the first to the last
betting day that included a bet. We obtained the average
number of bets per active betting day by dividing the total
number of bets made by the total number of active betting
days, and the average size of bets in Euro by dividing the
total money wagered by the total number of bets. These
two gambling behavior measures were highly positively
skewed with many cases on the left and fewer cases (but
still substantial numbers due to the large sample size) on
the right side of the distribution. Log-transformations
were performed to generate normal distributions for these
measures.
We calculated the percentage of losses by subtracting the
total amount of winnings from the total amount of wagers
and dividing the difference by the total amount of wagers.
This measure was highly negatively skewed and transfor-
mations did not help approximate a normal distribution.
We therefore categorized this variable to capture (1) users
who were overall winners (negative percentage of losses),
(2) users with the lowest percentage of losses (operation-
ally defined as losses of 0 to <20%), (3) users with an
intermediate percentage of losses (i.e., 20 to <80%), and
(4) users with the highest percentage of losses (i.e., 80 to
100%). We chose the cut-point of the lowest percentage of
losses to approximately agree with the expected losses,
which according to the target returns expected by the
operator are approximately 13% for fixed-odds betting
and 6% for live-action betting. The 20% cut-point reflects
the nearest rounded percentage. For the cut-point of the
highest percentage of losses, we applied the same 20%
margin, and the remaining percentage of losses was cate-
gorized as intermediate.
Most Involved Bettors
We defined most involved bettors (MIB) subgroups as the
top 1% of the sample regarding the total number of bets,
total amount of wagers, and net loss (i.e., subtracting the
total amount of winnings from the total amount of
wagers) on fixed-odds or live-action betting. We used a
scree-type analysis of centile plots to empirically identify
these 1%-subgroups [17]. This strategy allowed us to clas-
sify MIB into six non-exclusive groups: (1) total number
of bets; (2) total amount of wagers; (3) net loss for fixed-
odds players (each of these groups n = 462); (4) total
number of bets; (5) total amount of wagers; and (6) net
loss for live-action players (each of these group n = 322).
A total of 984 users belonged to at least one of the fixed-
odds MIB groups (2.13% of 46267 fixed-odds players),
and a total of 613 users belonged to at least one of the live-
action MIB groups (1.90% of 32277 live-action players).
Analyses
In addition to providing descriptive statistics, we con-
ducted two primary comparative analyses. First, we exam-
ined differences in gambling behavior between users who
did and did not exceed deposit limits using independent-
samples tests. These tests employed the gambling behav-
ior measures that were aggregated across 2 years. We also
looked to see whether the proportion of most involvedHarm Reduction Journal 2008, 5:27 http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/5/1/27
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betters was greater among individuals who exceed limits
compared to those who did not. Second, we analyzed
individuals' differences in gambling behavior before and
after exceeding deposit limits within users who exceeded
limits using paired-samples tests. These tests compared
the gambling behavior measures that were created for the
period of time before and after receipt of the notification
message.
The procedures of limiting deposits and sending notifica-
tions were only in effect starting late September 2005,
about 8 months after the beginning of our study. Users of
our cohort experienced no restrictions to the amount of
money they could deposit during the first 8 months after
they registered with bwin. This could potentially bias our
findings: On one side, only a subset of people who regis-
tered in February 2005 was still active in September 2005
(e.g., of the 47000 sports, 27726 or 59% had deposited
money after September 2005) and thus could experience
the new deposit limit policies. Short-term bettors might
exhibit a low extent of gambling behavior, potentially
resulting in overestimating the differences between users
who did and did not exceed limits. We therefore repeated
the analyses within the subset of users who had deposited
money after September 2005.
Alternatively, certain deposit activities could have been
possible before September 2005, but might have con-
flicted with company-imposed or self-imposed deposit
limits after September 2005. For example, people could
deposit very large amounts during the first 8 months but
not after September 2005. People might have chosen to
self-limit their deposit amount but had no option to do so
before September 2005. We had no means of identifying
people who would have been subject to one of the limits
before September 2005, and thus no means of excluding
these people from the analyses. However, in our analyses
these people are considered users who did not exceed lim-
its, yielding conservative estimates for the comparisons of
users who did and did not exceed limits.
Analyses involving the average number of bets per active
betting day and the average size of bets in Euro used the
log-transformed variables; however, we report means,
standard deviations, and medians for the untransformed
variables for descriptive purposes.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Of the 47000 sports bettors, 160 (0.3%) had received at
least one notification message about exceeding deposit
limits. Five (3.1%) were women and 155 (96.9%) were
men, and the mean age was 30.8 years (SD = 9.2). Most of
the bettors who exceeded limits played both types of
games: 159 (99.4%) were fixed-odds players and 149
(93.1%) were live-action players; 148 of the 149 who
played live-action also played fixed-odds. Among users
who placed both fixed-odds and live-action bets, 0.5% (n
= 148) received a notification message, compared to 0.1%
(n = 11) of users who played fixed-odds only and 0.1% (n
= 1) of users who played live-action only (χ2 = 46.95, df =
2, p < .001).
These 160 notified users received between 1 and 267 noti-
fication messages, with a mean of 14 messages (SD = 29,
Median = 6). Of the 160 users, 5 (3.1%) stopped deposit-
ing money in their accounts after receiving the notifica-
tion message. One user had tried to deposit more than the
allowed amount with the very first deposit. The mean
number of deposits before receiving the notification mes-
sage was 57 (SD = 89, Median = 20) with a range of 1 to
796. The mean number of days between the date of the
first deposit and the date of the first notification message
was 372 (SD = 184, Median = 380) with a range of 0 to
741.
To describe the general distribution of deposits, we exam-
ined the maximum amount deposited per 24-hour and
30-day period among the 46840 sports bettors who never
received a notification message. Table 1 reports the mean
(SD) and centiles for this measure. The vast majority of
users never came close to the limits of 1000 Euros/24
hours or 5000 Euros/30 days.
Comparing Gambling Behavior between Users who Did 
and Did Not Exceed Deposit Limits
Table 2 presents a comparison of gambling behavior
aggregated across 2 years for users who did and did not
exceed their established deposit limits. Results were simi-
lar for fixed-odds and live-action betting. The percentage
of active betting days for these groups was not signifi-
cantly different. The average number of bets per active bet-
ting day and the average size of bets were higher among
users who exceeded deposit limits compared to users who
did not exceed deposit limits. The distribution of the cat-
egorized percentage of losses was more favorable among
users who exceeded deposit limits; that is, the likelihood
of the lowest percentages of losses was significantly higher
and the likelihood of the intermediate and the highest
percentages of losses were significantly lower among users
who exceeded deposit limits.
Despite losing a smaller proportion of what they wagered,
users who exceeded limits still, on average, lost signifi-
cantly more than users who did not exceed limits. That is,
the mean net loss on fixed-odds of users who did exceed
limits was 1,135 Euro (SD = 2,766, Median = 213) com-
pared to 185 Euro (SD = 1,028, Median = 50) for users
who did not exceed limits (t = 11.51, p < .001) (live-Harm Reduction Journal 2008, 5:27 http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/5/1/27
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action: 1,975 Euro, SD = 5,569, Median = 135, compared
to 187 Euro, SD = 1,414, Median = 13, t = 14.91, p < .001).
Exceeding deposit limits was a significant predictor of
being in the MIB subgroups. For example, 14.5% of users
who received notification messages, belonged to at least
one of the fixed-odds MIB groups, compared to 2.1% who
did not; this association yielded an odds ratio of 7.95
(95% CI 5.08 – 12.42). Further, 14.8% of users who
received notification messages compared to 1.8% of those
who did not, belonged to at least one of the live-action
MIB groups; this association yielded an odds ratio of 9.24
(95% CI 5.84 – 14.64). Table 3 presents the associations
between individual MIB groups and exceeding limits.
Within the group of people who exceeded limits, we com-
pared users who belonged to at least one of the fixed-odds
or live-action MIB groups to users who did not belong to
a MIB group on the gambling behavior measures. Users
belonging to a MIB group had a higher percentage of
active betting days and a higher average number of bets
per active betting day on fixed-odds and live-action, and a
higher average size of bet on live-action. The distribution
of the categorized percentage of losses was not signifi-
cantly different between users who did and did not belong
to a MIB group.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for maximum amount of euros 
deposited by time period
Euro in 24 hours Euro in 30 days
Mean (SD) 111 (258) 243 (725)
Percentile
25th 25 30
50th (Median) 40 50
75th 100 150
90th 250 500
95th 500 1050
99th 1000 3768
Table 2: Gambling behavior in users who did and did not exceed deposit limits
Fixed-odds (n = 46267) Live-action (n = 32277)
Gambling behavior
measure
Users who
did exceed limits 
(n = 159)
Users who
did not exceed 
limits (n = 46108)
Difference
test
Users who
did exceed limits 
(n = 149)
Users who
did not exceed 
limits (n = 32128)
Difference
test
Percentage of 
active
betting days
Mean (SD) 21 (20) 25 (29) 26 (28) 31 (37)
Median 14 13 16 11
Log Mean (SD) -- -- t = -1.90 -- -- t = -1.71
Average number 
of
bets per active
betting day
Mean (SD) 7 (13) 4 (7) 8 (14) 4 (5)
Median 3 2 4 3
Log Mean (SD) 0.60 (0.40) 0.44 (0.32) t = 6.12* 0.68 (0.42) 0.46 (0.34) t = 7.98*
Average size of 
bet
in Euro
Mean (SD) 25 (55) 11 (30) 27 (41) 11 (25)
Median 8 4 12 4
Log Mean (SD) 0.96 (0.60) 0.67 (0.51) t = 7.14* 1.07 (0.58) 0.65 (0.53) t = 9.59*
Categorized 
percentage of 
losses
Overall 
winners
n (%) 26 (16.4) 6755 (14.7) 25 (16.8) 6924 (21.6)
Lowest 
percentage of 
losses
n (%) 59 (37.1) 12367 (28.8) 73 (49.0) 10548 (32.8)
Intermediate 
percentage of 
losses
n (%) 56 (35.2) 19338 (41.9) 40 (26.8) 9533 (29.7)
Highest 
percentage of 
losses
n (%) 18 (11.3) 7648 (16.6) Chi2 = 10.91* 11 (7.4) 5123 (15.9) Chi2 = 20.58*
* p < .05.Harm Reduction Journal 2008, 5:27 http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/5/1/27
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Comparing Gambling Behavior Before and After 
Exceeding Deposit Limits
Table 4 shows the comparison of gambling behavior
before and after exceeding deposit limits. Of the 159
fixed-odds players, 143 had activity both before and after
exceeding deposit limits and are included in Table 4; like-
wise, of the 149 live-action players, 105 had activity both
before and after and are included in the Table.
Again, similar patterns of results emerged for fixed-odds
and live-action betting. The percentage of active betting
days and the distribution of the categorized percentage of
losses did not change. The average size of bet increased
and the average number of bets per active betting day
decreased after exceeding deposit limits.
Analyses for Users Who Deposited Money after September 
2005
To control for potential biases that might result from the
notification messages being introduced only after Septem-
ber 2005, we repeated all the above analyses with the sub-
set of 27726 users (59% of the total sample) who had still
deposited money after September 2005. These analyses
compare the 159 fixed-odds players who exceeded limits
with 27442 users who did not exceed limits, and the 149
live-action players who exceeded limits with 21433 users
Table 3: Proportions of most involved bettors (MIB)1 among users who did and did not exceed deposit limits
Fixed-odds (n = 46267) Live-action (n = 32277)
MIB group Users who did
exceed limits
(n = 159)
Users who
did not
exceed limits
(n = 46108)
Odds ratio 
(95% CI)
Users who
did exceed
limits
(n = 149)
Users who
did not
exceed limits
(n = 32128)
Odds ratio
(95% CI)
Total number of bets 6.3% 1.0% 6.78 (3.55 – 12.95) 6.0% 1.0% 6.53 (3.30 – 12.94)
Total amount of wagers 8.8% 1.0% 9.84 (5.64 – 17.17) 11.4% 0.9% 13.44 (8.01 – 22.55)
Net loss 9.4% 1.0% 10.64 (6.20 – 18.26) 12.1% 0.9% 14.38 (8.68 – 23.85)
1MIB are defined as the top 1% of the sample regarding the total number of bets, total amount of wagers, and net loss on fixed-odds or live-action 
betting.
Table 4: Gambling behavior before and after exceeding deposit limits
Fixed-odds (n = 143) Live-action (n = 105)
Gambling behavior
measure
Before After Difference
test
Before After Difference
test
Percentage of active
betting days
Mean (SD) 23 (22) 26 (26) 27 (23) 26 (25)
Median 14 17 20 19
Log Mean (SD) -- -- t = -1.37 -- -- t = 0.11
Average number of
bets per active
betting day
Mean (SD) 6 (12) 7 (15) 11 (18) 9 (17)
Median 3 3 6 5
Log Mean (SD) 0.59 (0.38) 0.49 (0.43) t = 4.10* 0.78 (0.42) 0.71 (0.44) t = 2.47*
Average size of bet
in Euro
Mean (SD) 21 (48) 44 (107) 25 (43) 32 (45)
Median 7 9 11 17
Log Mean (SD) 0.90 (0.57) 1.04 (0.70) t = -3.63* 1.03 (0.57) 1.17 (0.59) t = -4.27*
Categorized
percentage of losses
Overall winners n (%) 30 (21.0) 20 (14.0) 17 (16.2) 21 (20.0)
Lowest
percentage of
losses
n (%) 41 (28.7) 40 (28.0) 59 (56.2) 43 (410)
Intermediate
percentage of losses
n (%) 56 (39.2) 47 (32.9) 24 (22.9) 31 (29.5)
Highest
percentage of losses
n (%) 16 (11.2) 36 (25.2) Chi2 = 15.30 5 (4.8) 10 (9.5) Chi2 = 9.38
* p < .05.Harm Reduction Journal 2008, 5:27 http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/5/1/27
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who did not exceed limits. Overall these analyses yielded
the same pattern of results, although the percentage of
active betting days was significantly different between the
limit-exceeding and non-limit-exceeding groups for fixed-
odds betting and the distribution of the categorized per-
centage of losses was not significantly different between
the two groups for either fixed-odds or live-action betting.
The odds ratios for belonging to the MIB subgroups were
slightly lower overall: between 4.06 and 6.53 for the fixed-
odds MIB groups and between 4.37 and 9.78 for the live-
action MIB groups. The analyses of gambling behavior
before and after exceeding deposit limits necessarily are
identical to the overall results.
Discussion
The company-imposed or self-imposed deposit limits
affected only a minority of bwin Internet sports bettors.
Very few people, only 0.3% of our sample, ever tried to
exceed these deposit limits. Furthermore, the vast majority
of the sample (i.e., 95%) never deposited more than 500
Euro per 24 hours, half the maximum allowed 1000
Euros, and never deposited more than 1050 Euro per 30
days, a fifth of the maximum allowed 5000 Euros. This
means that bwin could reduce the deposit limits substan-
tially (e.g., by half) and still most people would not
exceed these limits.
One reason for the finding that the deposit limits were
hardly exceeded might be that the sports bettors are highly
responsible gamblers who bet for fun and spend relatively
low amounts on betting. Another reason might be that
users are well aware of bwin's deposit limits policies and
purposely avoid violating them. The deposit limits are
presented as part of the general terms and conditions that
every user needs to accept when opening an account with
bwin. Our findings seem to indicate that knowing about
the deposit limits prevented some bettors from exceeding
the deposit limits and subsequently from losing money. If
this is correct, then the mere provision of deposit limits
can serve as a harm reduction device.
We examined whether the deposit limits seemed to safe-
guard the gambling behavior of the minority that
exceeded the deposit limits. People who exceed deposit
limits constitute a group of bettors who are willing to
place larger bets than people who do not exceed deposit
limits; yet, they appear to do this in a manner that keeps
their percentage of losses lower than others in the sample.
Although the percentage of losses might be more favora-
ble among people who exceed limits, compared to people
who do not exceed limits, their net loss still is significantly
higher. Because these bettors place very large bets they are
at high risk for losing very large amounts of money.
We identified exceeding limits as a strong predictor for
being in the MIB subgroups. People who exceed limits are
about 6 to 14 times more likely to belong to the various
MIB groups. Thus, exceeding the limits is associated with
a high likelihood of being in the group of bettors that bet,
wagered and/or lost the most; these activities are possible
indicators of disordered gambling. Consistent with this
notion, we found that among people who exceed limits,
people who belong to MIB groups show more intensive
gambling behavior than people who do not belong to
MIB groups. That is, those who belong to MIB groups bet
more often, place more bets, and place larger bets.
Our comparison of the gambling behavior before and
after exceeding limits found that exceeding the limits did
not have a diminishing effect on gambling behavior. The
number of bets was the only measure of gambling behav-
ior that evidenced a minor decrease after exceeding limits.
This decrease was offset by a steep increase in the size of
bets after exceeding limits. The number of days of play
and the percentage of losses did not change. Thus, we
found no indication that receiving the limit notification
message influences users to curtail their betting activity.
Rather, the findings suggest that exceeding deposit limits
encourages players to shift their strategy; they begin to
make more calculated, informed risks with single large
bets compared to before exceeding the deposit limit.
The finding that the feedback about a violation of a policy
or regulation does not have the intended harm-reducing
effect is a finding consistent with other evidence about
regulating behavior. For example, people who were given
feedback that their blood alcohol levels exceeded legal
drink-drive limits have been nonetheless subsequently
observed to drive [18-20]. Drivers who received speeding
tickets have been shown to be at increased risk of receiving
subsequent speeding tickets [21]. Likewise, smokers who
were given biomedical feedback indicating negative
effects of smoking did not initiate appreciable changes
towards quitting smoking [22].
No differences emerged in the patterns of results for fixed-
odds and live-action betting. Fixed-odds and live-action
propositions might differ in the extent of skill required to
place successful (i.e., winning) bets. Whereas placing a
successful bet in fixed-odds might be determined more by
skill (or knowledge) than by chance, placing a successful
bet in live-action likely is determined more by chance
than by skill. Thus, we could have expected our findings
to mirror the differing outcomes of games of skill versus
games of chance. Our findings instead show that, with
regard to evaluating the risk of disordered gambling
among people who exceed deposit limits, distinguishing
fixed-odds from live-action betting does not provide addi-
tional information.Harm Reduction Journal 2008, 5:27 http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/5/1/27
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Limitations
Our study examines conceptually different deposit limits.
Some limits are mandatory and imposed by bwin: the
default limits of 1000 Euros per 24 hours or 5000 Euros
per 30 days, and the increase of the default limits by the
amount of winnings. The users voluntarily impose other
limits: restrictions to a lower amount than the default lim-
its, or exemption from default limits for users with excep-
tional financial means. When exploring the effects of
exceeding deposit limits, we combined the different
deposit limits. Although different deposit limits are exam-
ined in this study, an essential similarity of all deposit lim-
its is that they represent specific, predetermined
maximum values that certain users are not willing to or
are not able to comply with. To this extend, the current
study investigates effects of exceeding pre-set deposit lim-
its.
We can posit that different types of limits might be associ-
ated with different effects on gambling behavior. There-
fore, an analysis differentiating the types of limits would
have been desirable. Unfortunately, no information was
available about the type of limit that led to issuing a noti-
fication message; thus this analysis was not an option for
this paper.
It is important to note that the procedures of limiting
deposits and sending notification messages were not in
effect during the entire two-year study period. We per-
formed some statistical controls in our analyses to
account for this fact, and the overall results remained
largely unchanged. Thus, we consider our findings to
reflect generalizable effects of deposit limits on Internet
sports gambling behavior.
Conclusion
The deposit limits examined in this study are part of the
corporate social responsibility agenda of bwin. This harm
reduction practice is consistent with recommendations to
integrate safety features for the prevention of disordered
gambling into gambling websites [16].
This study indicates that current deposit limits affect only
a very small minority of Internet sports bettors. The vast
majority of Internet bettors seem to be able to regulate
themselves and require little additional safeguards; how-
ever, some bettors can benefit from additional limits.
Consequently, for Internet gambling operators reluctant
to include harm reduction measures, an interesting mes-
sage is that a company's financial loss due to imposing
such safeguards such as deposit limits will be rather small
and balanced by the promoting effect of being regarded as
a socially responsible company.
In this study, we saw that the mandatory limits exceed
what most people are willing to spend on Internet gam-
bling activities. However, the mandatory limits also
exceed what most people could possibly spend without
taking substantial financial risks. Thus, while the current
mandatory limits might help prevent the loss of extremely
large amounts of money and cases of bankruptcy, these
limits still allow users to transfer substantial amounts of
money each day and each month, which can lead to finan-
cial problems for gamblers without sufficient financial
means. For these cases, instead of the company-imposed
limits, the self-imposed limits might have value.
This study shows that people who try to exceed deposit
limits have some poor outcomes: a high likelihood of
placing an extremely large number of bets, wagering
extremely large amounts, and/or loosing extremely large
amounts of money. These people constitute a group of
bettors who appear to be willing to take high risks; yet,
surprisingly, they appear to do this rather successfully
because their percentage of losses (but not their net loss)
is lower than others in the sample.
Without deposit limits, the behavioral and financial con-
sequences of gambling might be even more adverse. These
unintended consequences of Internet gambling indicate
that the bwin deposit limits could aid in the prevention of
adverse gambling-related consequences. More research is
necessary to determine the extent of this influence and to
monitor and revise such notification systems so that the
promise of limits can be optimized. For example, recent
research suggests that gambling activity, or behavioral
engagement in gambling, might be as important to con-
sider as financial considerations [23]. Such findings sug-
gest that corporations need not limit harm reduction
techniques to financially-related factors. Rather, tech-
niques that account for temporally-related factors (e.g.,
amount of time spent gambling) remain open to consid-
eration and examination. Online gambling companies
would benefit from testing the harm reduction value of
warning systems for amount of time spent gambling.
In this study, we examined deposit limits as a single harm
reduction measure of a single Internet gambling provider.
Unfortunately, users can sidestep such single safeguards
easily; another Internet gambling provider is just a mouse-
click away. To implement effective safeguards, concerted
harm reduction efforts of companies, users, public health
organs, and others are necessary. Ways of achieving this
goal might include the development of policy requiring
safety provisions as a prerequisite for licensing providers,
or having companies cooperate to employ software pro-
grams and technology tools to regulate user gambling.Publish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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The findings of this study originate from actual gambling
behavior and betting activity, without any direct contact
with individual gamblers. A previous study analyzing
Internet sports betting behavior in this manner indicated
that, at the population level, gambling activity is moder-
ate, as evidenced by analyses of time (e.g., people were
active less than half the time possible, despite infinite
access), activity (e.g., most placed less than 4 bet/day dur-
ing such limited active periods), and expenditures (e.g.,
most placed bets less than 5 Euros) [4,17]. Future research
needs to investigate how these findings compare with sub-
jective assessments of perceptions and behaviors by the
individual. If additional research supports the findings of
this study, technology-based screening tools for gam-
bling-related problems could incorporate the attempt to
deposit more than the allowed amount of money as an
early indicator of a person's vulnerability to disordered
gambling.
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